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INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES*
HUGO J. HAHNt
I
DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT
Although in many national systems of law, the term "public authority" and its
equivalents in non-English legal terminology have a fairly specific meaning,' its assess-
ment as an institution of international public law must proceed from elements of fact
and law so divergent that, on first sight, an enumeration of cases rather than a defini-
tion of the concept would seem appropriate. To begin with a purely verbal considera-
tion, it may be noted that the term "authority" is employed in treaties to designate
international institutions which are intergovernmental organizations2 as well as others
which are organs of such organizations,' or to denote one or more States administer-
ing a trust territory under chapter twelve of the United Nations Charter The ex-
amples here chosen also show far-reaching differences between the entities called
"authorities" as regards legal status, functions, and powers. The word refers to bodies
with and without international personality; to institutions with specific-and limited
-administrative and operational functions in respect of some political or economic
activity; 5 and to the trustee administering a given territory and there unrestrictedly
exercising the rights of the sovereign
Yet, these international "authorities" have in common their bases-treaties" or
*The views expressed in this study are those of the writer alone, and do not necessarily reflect the
official opinion of the Organization which he serves. The article was in print before September 30, 196i,
when the O.E.C.D. Convention came into force.
tLL.M. 1952, Harvard University; Dr. iur. 1953, University of Frankfurt, Germany. Assistant Legal
Adviser, Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, 1958-i96i; Assistant Legal Adviser, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1961 (on leave of absence from the German Federal
Civil Service since 1958).
C f. Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, supra, at 591-618; and Dallmayr, Public and
Semi-Public Corporations in France, infra, at 755-93.
'E.g., the United Nations Organization (U.N. CmtRTE.R art. 8I); the International Ruhr Authority.
For text of the agreement relating thereto, see 83 U.N.T.S. io5 (1951).
8E.g., the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.). See E.C.S.C.
Treaty arts. 7-19; 1 Amos PEASLEE (ED.), INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, CoNSrrrUTIONAL
DocumENTs 358 (1956) [hereinafter cited as PEASLEE].
"U.N. CuimA arts. 8i, 84.
'E.g., the High Authority of E.C.S.C., as well as the Commissions of the European Economic
Community (E.E.C.) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
0 Cf. Trusteeship Agreement with Italy on the Administration of the Territory of Somali, art. 7, U.N.
Gen. Assembly Resolution 442(V) of Dec. 2, 1950; 2 CLAUDE COLLIARD (ED.), AcruALrr- INTE NATIONALE
aT DIPLOMATIQUE i950-56, at 65, 69 (1957).
" "International Law prescribes no form for international engagements. There is no legal distinction
between formal and informal engagements. If an agreement is intended by the parties to be binding, to
affect their future relations, then the question of the form it takes is irrelevant to the question of its
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other international acts binding on those who have accepted them--and their con-
finement to functions the preponderant elements of which are neither law-making,
nor regulatory, nor judicial in nature.
If this suggests the activity of international public authorities to be comparable
to that of executive agencies within a State, one of the domains attributed to such
authorities would have been staked out appropriately once it is understood that in
international no less than in internal law, executive functions are "merely the
residue ...after legislative and judicial functions have been taken away."' The
execution of rules of public international law contained in treaties and law-making
acts of international institutions, or in the body of applicable customary law, consti-
tutes only one aspect of executive action.
Neither specifically legislative nor specifically judicial international organizations
are equipped to take immediate, if necessary physical, action for the maintenance
of international peace and security;1" the government of internationalized terri-
tories; 1 or the provision of services which are too expensive, too complex tech-
nically, too dangerous, or otherwise unsuitable to be furnished by one State alone 2
Thus, international public authorities are bound, in the exercise of their main func-
tions, to enact orders of a general nature closely resembling if not substantially
identical with law-making, 3 and to take decisions for the settlement of specific
disputes. 4 Yet these functions, constantly widening for technological, economic,
existence. What matters is the intention of the parties, and that intention may be embodied irt a Treaty
or Convention or Protocol or even a Declaration contained in the minutes of a Conference." Legal advice
given to the United Kingdom government, as reported in ARNOLD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TRATIES 48
(1938). See, to the same effect, I C ARLEs RoussEAu, PRINCIP.ES GfNRA3X Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 143
(1944); I FIEDRict BEaRBE, LE-RBUCH DES V6LKasERECHTs 413 (i960). On the exchange of notes as
treaties, see Weinstein, Exchanges of Notes, 29 BarrISH YARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as BarT. YB. INrL L.]. 3 GEoRG DAle, V6LKERRECHT (r961), which appeared after
this article was in print, gives at pp. 57-x64 the most recent account of the law of treaties.
' Especially acts of international organizations with binding effect, whether they are called decisions,
resolutions, or recommendations. See generally, on this question, i GEORO Dtmia, V6LxERRtci-r 25-28
(1958); Virally, La valeur juridique des recommendations des organisations internationales, 2 ANNUAIRE
FRAN'AIS Du DRoIr INTERNATIONAL 66 (1956) [hereinafter cited as A.F.]; Dahm, Die vijikerrechtliche
Verbindlichkeit von Emplehiungen internationaler Organisationen, 12 DIE OFFENTLICHE VP.RWALTUNG 361
(1959). For a well-informed summary of practice and opinion, see 2 GEORG DA-IM, V6LxEERrrT 25-35
(i96i). Drafts of trusteeship agreements under chapter XII of the U.N. Charter have been submitted by
the prospective administering states to the appropriate organs of the United Nations for approval. See
The Authority Which Will Exercise the Administration of the Trust Territory (Art. 8i), 4 REPFRTORY
oF PRACTICE oF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 225, 226, paras. 65-67 (1955); General Survey, 4 id. 272, 273,
paras. i8-2o (1955); Wolfe, The States Directly Concerned: Article 79 of the United Nations Charter,
42 Aat. J. INT'L L. 368, 387 (1948).
o7 HALsBuRy's LAWS OF ENGLAND 192 (3 d Simonds ed. 1954).
" See generally Jumus STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICT (1954).
"Discussed in Mffi Ynrr, INTERNATiONALIZED TERRITORIES (i96i).
2 H. ADAM, LES ETABLISSEMENTS PUBLICS INTERNATIONAUX passim (1957). See also, the assessment
of Adam's theses by Langrod, Quelques aspects du problP'rne des etablissements publics internationaux, 7
ARCIeVS DES V6LKERtECHTS 153 (1958); and Parry, The International Public Corporation, in W. FRIED-
&ANN (ED.), THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 495 (1954).
" See the references in note 8 supra; Merle, Le Pouvoir Reglementaire des Institutions Internationales,
4 A.X. 341, 351 (1958); Scheuner, Die Rechtsetzungsbejugnis internationaler Gemeinschaften, FasT-
se~RuIr VRDaoss 229, 237 (i960).
"A summary of treaty provisions can be found in Colliard, Le Raglement des difidrends dans les
organisations inter-gouvernementales de caract~re non politique, MiLANGE BASDEVANT 152, 154 (196o).
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and political reasons, are equalled in importance, if not in scope, by a further activity
assumed by international public authorities: the control exerted by them over subjects
of international and internal law alike for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
public international law.' 5
Functionally, an international public authority might therefore be defined as an
institution of an executive or supervisory nature in the service of a community of
States,"6 established by or in conformity with' 7 a treaty, and responsible for the
application of specific rules of international law which it implements itself or which,
by appropriate means of control, it causes others to implement. 8 It may also fulfill
both of these functions.'0
One particular type of intergovernmental institution that fits into this definition
is the supranational public authority. Subject only to the treaty providing for its
establishment and functioning, and bound neither in the person of any individual
member, nor collectively by instructions from any government, the supranational
authority, as represented thus far by the High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) and, to a lesser extent, by the Commissions of the
European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom), is a composite organ of an international public organization,
with primary responsibility for the implementation of the aims and purposes of that
organization irrespective of special desiderata of specific Member States. It is en-
dowed with the power to enforce the provisions of the treaty, and of rules made
and decisions taken thereunder directly against the Member States, their nationals,
and the property and rights of either of them, ° notwithstanding any objections by
"t See, on this development within the framework of international organizations, Mcrle, supra note
13; Monaco, Le contrdle dans l'organisation internationale, FEs-rscRFTsr SCHXTzEL 329 (ig6o). For a
discussion of the law of international controls generally, see Hahn, Internationale Kontrollen, in HANS-
JijRGEN SCHLOCHAUER (ED.), WRTERBUCH DES VaLxERmEcHTS 66 (2d ed. z961) [hereinafter cited as
ScmocHtAUaR]; Hahn, Der Masstab der internationalen Autisicht im Friedensutlderrecht, 1o JAIIRuCH
FjR INTERNATIONALEs RECH 2 (German) (196i) [hereinafter cited as J.I.R.]
"o This part of the definition permits the inclusion of authorities which obviously arc conducting affairs
of an international character but at the same time are attached, if not subject to, a specific national
law, as for instance, the Mosel Company (infra, at 65o-5!), or are even part of the administrative hier-
archy of one State, like the Badische Wasser-und Strassenbaudirektion under the Geneva Protocol of Dec.
x8, 1929 (infra, at 649).
17 For example, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
under the U.N. Charter which was originally established by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3 o2(IV)
of Dec. 8, X949. The view set forth in the text does not imply the acceptance of Scelle's theory of
'dfdoublement fonctionnel" according to which any organ of a State applying rules of international law,
as for example a national judge applying provisions of a treaty, is considered an organ both of the
international and of the internal legal order. For a brief exposition, see Scelle, Le phenomnne tridique
de ddoublement fonctionnel, FESTSCHRIFT W IERO 324 (1956). A critique of this theory will be found
in C. DE VISSCHER, THgORIES ET R]ALITiS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 175 (3d ed. x96o).
" For art exhaustive collection of examples of international control, see PMLIP C. JESSUP & HOwARD J.
TAUBENFELD, CoNTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY xx-1 16 (1959).
'o On this aspect, see infra, at 662-63.
On the interaction between the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. and the two supranational commis-
sions on the one hand and the further organs of the Communities on the other hand, see Manch, Zur
Systematik der Organe der europaischen Gem einschaflen, FEsTSCHRIFT ScMTzEL 338 ( 960); id.,
Prollgomnnes h zine thlorie constitutionelle des Communautis Europennes, I RivIsr DI Dutirro
EUROPEO x26 (596i) (Italian); Jaenicke, Atussprache zu den Berichten von Professor Mfinch und
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the territorial sovereign. In as much as such a body is the main instrument for the7
application of an organizational treaty, this justifies the whole organization to be
considered as supranational. This preponderance of the supranational organ or
organs within an organization distinguishes the three present manifestations of that
type of authority"' from its forbears which had also executory powers as against.
States and subjects of internal law but were not the principal organs within their-
respective organizations.
II
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
So many intergovernmental organizations or organs thereof, as well as independ-
ent intergovernmental bodies without an organizational framework, international per-
sonality, or permanent character,22 are authorities as the term is tentatively under-
stood here that the value of the concept might be clouded by an amorphous mass of
related phenomena if classification did not permit the recognition of groups of
cases and their distinctive features. Though frequently employed, classification
according to subject matter23 is more likely to bring to light the diversity of the insti-
tutional and procedural machinery used to cope with a particular set of facts than a
unifying normative element 4 Better suited to the purposes of this study seems to be-
characterization according to the legal functions fulfilled by such authorities, i.e.,.
in accordance with the legal nature of their activities. Broadly speaking, four main.
categories offer themselves:
(i) authorities having primary if not exclusive responsibility for the administra-
tion of specific territories or subject matters under international jurisdiction,
and vested with such rule-making and quasi-judicial tasks as may be inci-
dental to their main functions;
(ii) authorities restricted to purely executive or regulatory tasks, and devoid of
any other incidental powers;
(iii) authorities producing or distributing goods or offering services which coulr
possibly be provided just as well by lesser entities than associations of States or
bodies established by them, were it not for the belief-widely held by the
Privatdozent Steindorff, 2 BERICHTE DER DEruTSCHEN GESELLsCHAFr FOR V5LK:RRECHT 131 (1957);
Reuben & Effron, The Common Market and Euratom Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of
Europe, 6 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 670, 674 (1957). See also, symposium, European Regional Communities,.
26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 349-588 (I961).
" High Authority of the E.C.S.C., and the Commissions of E.E.C. and Euratom.
2"From which the notion "international organ" was originally derived. See Wehberg, Entwiick-
lungsstu en der Internationalen Organisation, 52 FRIEDEINSWARTE 193 (1954) and La Police Interna-
tionale, 48 ACADEM ,IE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUE1L DR COURS I, 15 (1934, II) [hereinafter cited
as R.C.]; Strupp, Les ragles genrales du Droit de la Paix, 47 id. 459, 531-34 (1934, I); Verdross,.
Le londement du droit international, 16 id. 299-307 (1927, 1).
"For the numerous writings following that method, see the bibliography preceding the chapters in Z.
Dums, op. cit. supra note 8, Pt. 3.
" That element is clearly brought out in Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems of International-
Organizations, 22 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1I (1945); KARL ZEIMIANEK, DAs VERTRAGSRECHT DER INTER-
NATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN passim (1957).
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
makers of foreign policy in many countries-that certain tasks of an opera-
tional nature should be entrusted to intergovernmental agencies;
(iv) authorities of all three types exercising supervisory functions and the more
far-reaching rights and obligations that usually go with the power to control.
III
INTENATONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS
Beginning with the venerable-and now functionally if not legally extinct-
European Commission of the Danube,25 there have been several intergovernmental
organizations with primary responsibility for the administration of the territories of
States or of parts thereof, rivers, other means of transportation and communication,
and border areas.
i. International territories
Thus, in accordance with articles forty-five to fifty of the Treaty of Versailles, the
Saar territory from 1919 to 1934 was administered in all respects by a Commission
appointed for this purpose by the Council of the League of Nations2" and the same
measure of sovereign rights was exercised by a League of Nations Commission be-
tween June 1933 and June 1934, over the area of Leticia at the Amazonas until it
was returned to Colombia following the termination of its conflict with Peru2
2. International waterways
It is likely that the ill-starred Peace Treaty of 192o with Turkey2" might have
created a Straits Commission with similar yet not as far-reaching sovereign powers
over the de-militarized land and sea area surrounding the Dardanelles, individuals
living there, and ships passing through. Yet, the classical example for the admin-
istration of an international waterway by an intergovernmental body remains the
European Commission of the Danube.
The common feature of these instances of international administration of terri-
"
5 The functions, powers, and status of the Commission were governed by numerous diplomatic
instruments, which are enumerated in 8 M. 0. HUDsON (ED.), INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 82 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as HUDSON]; 9 id. at 95. The Belgrade Danube Convention of Aug. is, 1948
(33 U.N.T.S. 181) purports to dissolve the European Commission of the Danube, whereas the Westcrn
Powers maintain that the Convention of 1921 (1 HUDSON 681) is still in force. The latter view is
also takein in SIiLE DE COOP-RATION SUR LE DANUBE, 1856-i956 passim (Rome 1956), a collection of
reports on the Commission's achievements published by the Commission at the occasion of its centenary.
An account of the opposing views is given in No. 37 der Beilagen zu den: Stenographischen Protokollen
des Nationalrates IX GP. (Austria), of Sept. 9, 1959, PP. 21-22.
P'Treaty of Versailles, § IV Annex, ch. 2. For further examples of territories which were inter-
nationalized in accordance with that Treaty, see YDiT, op. t. supra note IS, at 45.
T YDrr, op. cit. supra note II, at 59-62. Another example of the administration of a territory-under
the Feb. 10, 1947, Peace Treaty with Italy-was the government of the Free City of Trieste (1945-1954)
by a governor under the authority of the Security Council, appointed by and responsible to the United
Nations. Id. at 231-72.
"
5 This treaty never entered into force and was replaced by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, July 24,
1923; Loins LE FUR & GEORGES CmLAVER, RECUEIL DE TEXTES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBLIc 752
(2d ed. 1934).
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tory20 is the comprehensive power of the Authority to command as well as to enforce
its orders against States and individuals and their property. To that extent, such
an administration restricts the jurisdiction of the original territorial sovereign or
sovereigns, and acts in its or their stead. The ancillary powers of a rule-making
and judicial nature exercised by authorities of that kind" amply demonstrate that
the nations which established these administrations intended to make them
autonomous units of international government, subject only to such external political
or judicial controls as were specifically permitted by the international arrangements
defining their status.3'
3. Headquarters districts of international organizations
However, these are not the only examples for the administration of territory
by international authorities. Headquarters districts of international organizations
may be added to the list no matter whether one considers their rights and preroga-
tives as flowing from servitudes in favor of intergovernmental institutions 2 or from
the latter's position as proprietors and sovereigns of the areas in question?3
4. Boundary commissions
Still territorial in nature, but more restricted in scope, were the rights of interna-
tional commissions which, like the European Commission of the Danube by virtue
of the Treaty of Berlin of I878"4 and the Commission of Four by virtue of the
Lausanne Convention of April 24, I923," were to determine definitively the course
of a boundary, or like the Straits Commission, established by the latter treaty to.
enforce the demilitarization of a certain area.36
This group of cases has in common that administrative action is taken only
concerning States, and that such action affects individuals and their property ex-
clusively through the intermediary of the local sovereign.
5. Special cases
The United States-Canadian International Joint Commission established under
the Root-Bryce Treaty of i9I23m is apart from these groups in as much as it can both
grant concessions for specific uses of boundary waters, and arbitrate any controversy
between the two nations on the course of their common boundaries.
"' For a concise description of the above and other cases, see JEssUP & TAUBENFELD, Op. Cit. Supra
vote 18, at 50.
"
0For example, of the European Commission of the Danube under the 1921 Paris Convention insti-
tuting the Definitive Statute of the Danube. I HUDsoN 68i.
" See the analysis of the powers of the European Commission of the Danube in the advisory opinion
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, ser. A, No. 14 (1927).
'To this effect, see FERENC ALBERT VAIl, SERVrTUDEs OF INrERNATIONA LAW 295-97 (2d ed. 1958)_
'
8 As advocated by PHILIPPE CAmiER, ETUDE DES ACCORDS DE S5iGE CoNCLUS ENTRE LES ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES ET LES ETATS O ELLES RsIDENT 210-Il (1959). On the legal status of the premises
of international organizations generally, see CLARENCE W. JENxs, INTERNATIONAL IMMuNmrIas 46 et seq.
(196i).
, Art. 2. See MAX FLEISCMiANN, V6LKERRECIHTSQUELLEN 148 (1905) [hereinafter cited as FLztsCss-
MANN].
:r Art. 5. See 2 HUDsoN 1037.
88 Art. io. 2 HUDSON 5037.
"'Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada,
Jan. ix, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T. S. No. 548.
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The States acting as administering authorities under article eighty-one of the
United Nations Charter do not fit into any of the categories thus far enumerated.
Surely that administration is, like the whole trusteeship system, under the authority
.of the United Nations, 8 but to conclude that trust territories are therefore under
.international administration would overlook that the holders of governmental power
in its entirety in all trust territories are sovereign States, and that the functions of
.government are exercised by agents of those States and not by international organs or
officials, 30 however tightly the latter may control the trustee.40
With a certain measure of justification, it may be contended that the salient
features of the more permanent administrative authorities thus far mentioned, in
particular the European Commission of the Danube, may be understood as elements
,of condominium over territory41 as well as characteristics of international institutions.
,6. Supranational administrations
This observation does not apply to the supranational authorities provided for in
-the treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), the
European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom) .42 For while their powers are limited in scope and as to subject
:matter within the substantive fields assigned to them, they may exercise their
:functions over the whole territory of all the Member States, unfettered by boundaries
.and other geographical limitations. Historically, the prototype of this kind of
authority has been the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. It has retained that
.quality until today for no other reason than the reluctance of governments to assign
-powers of the same political weight to the two analogous bodies established in the
-wake of the Spaak report of 1956," the Commissions of the E.E.C. and of Euratom.
The High Authority of the E.C.S.C. is not only the administrative organ of the
Community, but is also clothed with political and law-making functions. It was
-the intention of the framers of the E.C.S.C. to make the High Authority the central
instrument for the establishment of a common market in coal and steel 4  In fact,
the Treaty offers sufficient evidence that this intention prevailed in the negotiations.
"'Decisions" which shall be "binding in all their details"; "recommendations" which
.are "binding with respect to the objectives they specify but shall leave to those
to whom they are directed the choice of appropriate means for attaining these ob-
jectives"; and "opinions" which "shall not be binding"4q-these are the arms which
the High Authority may use for the implementation of the Treaty. Decisions and
-recommendations of a general character must be published in the official gazette of
"U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
"See, to the same effect, ALFRED VEaRDoss & KARL. ZEMANE , V6LgERREcHT 478-79 ( 4 th ed. 1959).
°YDrr, op. cit. supra note Iz, at 66, 70.
"'For comment on this notion, see Schneider, Condominium, in I SCHLOCHAUER 297 (196o).
"E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 8 et seq.; E.E.C. Treaty art. 155 et seq.; Euratom Treaty art. 24 et seq.
"'INTrroOVERNMENTAr CoMMrrEE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, REPORT, April 21, 1956.
" Declaration of Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, May 9, 1950, in x CLAUDE COLLIMAD
<ED.), Daorr INTERNATIONAL E' HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE 815-i950o , at 761-63 (3d ed. 1955).
'
5 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 14.
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the E.C.S.C.48 Other decisions and recommendations take effect on notification to
the parties concerned. All decisions and recommendations are immediately binding
on the Member States, enterprises, and associations, and may be enforced as against
enterprises and associations,47 and to a lesser extent against Member States.
It is significant that in the E.C.S.C., it is ordinarily the High Authority which
has both the initiative and the responsibility for action under the constituent instru-
ment. Constitutionally required cooperation with the Council of Ministers48 usually
takes the form of an act of the High Authority with the assent of the Council. In
periods of crises, however, the Council exercises decisive authority, provided it acts
unanimously.49
The functions of the E.E.C. are, by contrast, much more limited ° Observers
agree that in the E.E.C., the Commission, though in principle equipped with the
same armory of measures as in the E.C.S.C., has only strictly limited and narrow
possibilities of regulatory action 1 It is predominantly an administrative organ
restricted to the preparation and the execution of the law-making acts of the Council
of Ministers which is charged with the implementation of the legislative program
of the E.E.C. Treaty 2 The Commission may exercise more far-reaching influence
on the Council by means of its constitutionally guaranteed right to initiate the action
of the Council,5 3 which the latter can extend by requesting the Commission to
submit proposals relating to additional subjectsO4
The picture would be incomplete were it not mentioned that the Commission
administers the European Social Fund and conducts the negotiations on behalf
of the Community with non-Member States and other international organizations,
though in doing so it is subject to the directives of the Council.55 On the other
hand, while under the E.C.S.C. Treaty, acts of the Council are not generally subject
to the judicial control of the Court of the Community on the application of the
Commission, the opposite is true under the E.E.C. and Euratom TreatiesO8
"Id. art. 15. The Journal Oflciel des Communauts Europiennes [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL
OFFICIEL] is now the official gazette of the three Communities. See Dkision portant creation du Journal
Officicl des Commnunaut&s Europiennes du 15 Septembre 1958, [x958] JOURNA. OFFICnIL 390, 419.
"'E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 47, 54(6), 58(4), 59(7), 65.
4s See, e.g., FRANZ WILHELM JERUSALEM, DAS RECHT DER MONTANUNIONT 33 0954)-
40 E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 58(3), 59(2). See MUNCH, OP. cit. supra note 20, at 353.
1o MUNCH, op. ct. supra note 20, at 353.
, See, e.g., Wohlfarth, Europdisches Recht, 9 J.I.R. 12, 12-13 (i96o); Stein dorff, Europiische Wirt-
schaltsgemeinscha/t, i SCHIOCHAUER 479, 482 (i960); v. d. Heydte, Die Politischen Organe der Eu-
xoptsiclen WVirtschaftsgemainschaft, 54 FRiRDENSWAtRTE I, 4-7 (1957).
53For a list of cases in which the E.E.C. Commission itself has powers of decision, see ERNST
iVOHLFARTH, ULuICH EVERLING, HANS JOACHIM GLAESNER & RUDOLF SPRUNG, DIE EUROPXISCHE WIRT-
2CHA5'TSGEMEINSCHAFT 461 (1960).
" Id. at 462.
"E.E.C. Treaty art. 152. But see E.E.C. Treaty art. 149, under which the Commission's proposals
may be changed only by a unanimous vote of the Council. However, this rule applies only to modifica-
tions, and not to final decisions on Commission proposals.
"E.E.C. Treaty arts. 124, 228, 229.
Go Article 33() of the E.C.S.C. Treaty which limits judicial review has not reappeared in the E.E.C.
and Euratom Treaties. This clause may afford the possibility of counteracting retarding movements of the
Council by judicial intervention on application of the Commission. E.E.C. Treaty art. 173.
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The powers of the Euratom Commission are more extensive, as the Euratom
Treaty itself largely implements the legislative measures required for the attainment
of its objectives. From a purely organizational point of view, the interplay of Com-
mission and Council is, however, the same as under the E.E.C. Treaty, since legisla-
tive action is as a rule initiated by the Commission but taken by the Council, whereas
the Commission has plenary jurisdiction over the administration of the Treaty and
all enactments of the Community issued thereunder.57
In sum, then, only the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. can at present be said to be
clothed with primary responsibility for the application of the Treaty and the imple-
mentation of those of its clauses which provide for legislative action, whereas the
two other supranational authorities are limited to tasks which under internal law
would be predominantly executive in nature. Yet, there is a possibility that the
executive organs of the E.E.C. and of Euratom, in spite of their more restricted statu-
tory role, may gain greater and perhaps decisive importance when the legislative
processes within the two more recent Communities approach completion, and ad-
ministration and execution of the Treaties and of the Council's legislation become the
main activities of the supranational organizations.
Still, there remains the great innovation that an international organization may,
through its various organs, act as law-maker and administrator whose acts no longer
require affirmative action by the Member States to be binding upon them, their
agencies, their nationals, and their enterprises. This gives the three supranational
authorities more far-reaching powers than any other functional international admin-
istration has heretofore possessed.5
IV
ExEcuTIvE AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
Examples of authorities of the purely executive type with no other incidental
powers are the now extinct International Danube Commission as it operated under
the Danube Convention of i92I,' 9 and the Danube Commission functioning under
the present 1948 Convention, "0 the validity of which remains contested."' In both
cases, the responsibility of the Commissions consists in the supervision of the areas
determined in the Convention; the planning of works required for the maintenance
and improvement of the waterway; failing action by a riparian State, the execution
of such works and, if need be, the determination of dues for the financing of the
river's maintenance and improvement. All these functions are executive in nature.
Tolls and dues are not in the nature of permanent tax-like levies, but are fees for
"Euratom Treaty art. I24(1). To the same effect, see the well-informed study by HELMUr DrtlcE,
DIE INTERNATIoNALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT BEI DER FmEDLICKEN VERWFNDUNG DER ATOMENERoIE INNEIALD
EUROPAS 78 (i959).
GSFor examples, see Jasstu & TAUBENFELD, op. cit. supra note i8, at 85-116.
V9i HunsoN 681.
6033 U.N.T.S. No. 518, at x8i, 187 (1949).
"See note 25 supra, and Seidl-Hohenveldern, Donau, in i SCHLOCU..uER 393 (x96o).
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specific services rendered or specific works done, which are payable only until a given
financial obligation assumed for such a purpose has been satisfied.
Another type of executive agency is represented by the institutions provided for
under Commodity Agreements, e.g., for sugar, wheat, tin, and rubber,62 which are
designed to guarantee a suitable income to producers and other interested parties
by appropriate marketing interventions and the restriction or increase of production
and sales, and to encourage consumption. This is not the place to discuss the
structural details of the Commodity Agreements.0 3 Suffice it to say that the powers
of the institutions concerned are almost always directed at meeting the exigencies of
specific crop years, production seasons, or other economic cycles which are, in
advance, limited in time and, therefore, offer instructive examples for executive
action in individual cases. This qualification ensues from the fact that the Agree-
ments provide not only the machinery and the guiding principles for that kind of
action but also rules about its particulars. Thus, the action of the Councils, apart
perhaps from the enactment of the Rules of Procedure,' is comparable to the adop-
tion of the budget by a parliament. Though general in appearance, such action is
limited to the decision of concrete and specific cases, to be implemented by Executive
Boards and Secretariats during a period of time limited and a set of facts specified
in advance. By the same token, the distribution of Marshall Plan Aid by the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) in the early years
of that Organization was executive rather than rule-making in character.P*
However, most of the present acts of the latter intergovernmental organization
which do not relate either to the internal administration and procedure of the
O.E.E.C. or to one of its operational activities in the fields of productivity and
nuclear energy, or to the European Monetary Agreement, appear to be regulatory in
nature. 0 Thus, not only the Code of Liberalisation and the Code of Liberalisation
of Capital Movements but most other acts of the O.E.E.C. which are devoid of any
link with a specific case or controversy are acts of legislation or quasi-legislation.pr
A like predominance of legislative action may be found in such organizations as
the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the Universal Postal
Union, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, and the World Health
Organization, as well as the European Free Trade Association. All of these through
02 See CmuAR.as H. ALEXANDROWICZ, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc ORGANISATIONS 179-85 (1953).
° Cf. Hahn, supra note 15, at I9-2o.
'E.g., the Rules of Procedure of November, 1959, enacted under the 1958 International Sugar
Agreement as printed in an undated brochure of the International Sugar Council, together with the
Agreement.
"See H. ADAM, L'ORGANISATION EUROPAENNE DE CooPERATIoN EcONOMIQUE passim (1949).
On the operational activities of the O.E.E.C., see infra, at 656-57.
"For an attempt to set out the constitutive elements of a rule-making by international organizations,
see Merle, supra note 13, at 341-43; SCHEUNER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 234. For accounts of the legisla-
tive activity of the O.E.E.C., see Freymond, Les 'Dicisions' de l'Organisation Europienne de Coopiration
Economique (O.E.C.E.), ii ANNUAIRE SUIssE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL 65 (1954); Elkin, The Organisa-
tlion for European Economic Co-operation, lts Structure and Powers, 4 EUROPEAN YEARaoos 96, 123-31(1958).
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various techniques promote the progress of international legislation or impose its pro-
visions on Member States. 68
V
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICES
Beyond the domain of the international executive and legislative agency there
is a group of cases, constantly growing in number, which represents the operational
element in the law of international organizations. These include such long-
established and well-reputed institutions as the Bank for International Settlements in
Basle, which, having been established in what may be called the "mail coach" period
of the international operational agency, offers every promise for further longevity,
as well as the Euratom Supply Agency. The latter, although perhaps representing a
doctrinal achievement in the law of international organizations, has attracted com-
ments which are most discouraging,6 but apparently justified.7° Still, it is this kind
of international and supranational authority which corresponds closest to its
namesake in the United States. The related institutions in the United States are
for the most part, and certainly for the most eye-catching part, e.g., the Tennessee
Valley Authority and the Port of New York Authority, operational in nature and
functions.
Before setting out the functional characteristics of this type of international public
service, it has to be affirmed 71 that the entities concerned are, like any other interna-
tional authorities-as that notion is understood here-established by or in accordance
with, and in conformity with treaties for the purpose of implementing specific treaty
rules providing for or allowing operational activities. It therefore seems irrelevant
for the purpose of staking out the domain of the international public service whether
services are rendered only to individuals and private legal entities and associations,
i.e., whether the use of a service is reserved to beneficiaries other than States and
intergovernmental organizations7 Nor is there any intrinsic necessity to consider as
international public services sovereign States, their agencies, their political or territorial
subdivisions and other corporate entities established under the public law of a
country, or private business concerns (whatever their form and status may be under
internal law), simply because they pursue economic activities that are not limited in
scope to the territory of one State onlyY3 The usefulness of considering all arrange-
ments transcending the territorial and jurisdictional limits of one State and the vari-
"SFor references to the relevant provisions, see Merle, supra note 13, at 343; Jenks, supra note 24, at
34.
S... quite to the contrary, there is an oversupply of uranium which makes this organization quite
superfluous. It was difficult to interpret the treaty provisions in such a manner that the Agency has
not been able to function until today .... ." Siegfried Balke, German Federal Minister for Nuclear
Affairs, in AUsGEWXH.LTE RcirrsFRAGEN AUS DEM GEIET DER EUROPXISCUHs GEMEINSCHAFTEN 12 (196o).
[Ed. transl.]
'oDR3eK, op. cit. supra note 57, at 71.
"'In view, notably, of H. ADtAm, LEs ETABISSEMENTS PUBLICS INTE1rNAr7oNAuX (957), and Sereni,
International Economic Institutions and the Municipal Law of States, 96 R.C. 133 (959, I).
72 To this effect, see ADAm, op. cit. supra note 71, at 133.
7 Sereni, supra note 71, at 133.
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ous corporate and noncorporate entities involved as a whole need no longer be
argued,7 4 in as much as this approach is particularly well suited to measure in their
entirety the legal consequences of a specified, actual or potential, chain of events
arising in connection with a transnational transaction. The merits of that method
are less evident when it is used for the critical assessment of a specific institution in
one specific field of law, national or international. -
Finally, there is no convincing proof that an international public service may not
have a policy-making body. 6 As will be seen, there are a considerable number of
international public services which in the course and by means of their operational
activities may either make or influence political decisions of considerable moment.
International bodies with operational functions exist now in many branches of
economic and social life. The diversity of tasks assumed by public international
services shows that they are considered as useful tools for cooperation in almost any
province of intergovernmental relations-political as well as nonpolitical.
I. Transportation
The field of transportation77 has attracted multi-State arrangements for centuries.
The relatively recent past has witnessed the advent of a still rising number of
operational agencies, most of which are concerned with the management and ad-
ministration of specific means of transportation or of installations ancillary thereto.
(a) River authorities. Thus, the Geneva Protocol of December 8, 1929, entrusted
the Badische Wasser und Strassenbaudirektion, Karlsruhe, an agency of the Land
(State) of Baden with the regulation of the Rhine between Strasbourg-Kehl and
Idstein under the direction of a Franco-German-Swiss Works Commission in which
each of the three States involved was represented by two members and which took
its decisions unanimously, the President of the Permanent Court of International
Justice appointing an arbiter in case of dissents.78 Though enjoying certain ad-
vantages, e.g., in the use of the public properties of the three States for purposes of
the works, the operational instrumentality, named Badische Wasser-und Strassen-
baudirektion, was practically devoid of privileges and immunities, absolute or
functional.
The same holds true of the Hafenverwaltung Kehl, a public authority (Kirper-
schaft des Wffenlichen Rechts) administering the Rhine port of Kehl which faces
Strasbourg and which was placed under a mixed Franco-German direction by a
compact of October 19, 1951, between the German Land Baden and the Port
Autonome de Strasbourg.79 Leaving aside questions of German constitutional law
'" PmLiP JEssup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) blazed the trail here.
' For a model of that kind of presentation, see Note, United States Agencies and International
Organizations Which Foster Private American Investment Abroad, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1102 (1958).
"7 See, however, ADAM, op. cit. supra note 71, at 9, ii.
7'7For a brief survey, JosEPH P. CAaBERLAIN, PHILIP C. JEsst3P, ADOLF LANDE & OLIVER J"
LissirzwN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3-7 (1955).
78 5 HUDSON 125.
"7 For the French text of Convention and Statute, see AOnti, op. cit. supra note 71, at 248.
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which arose out of this arrangement and led to a political controversy that was settled
by a decision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court,"0 it seems worth
stating that the Kehl Port Authority was created by the 1951 Protocol and the
Statute annexed thereto for the purpose of exempting the Port area and installations
from the administration of the Land Baden to which it had belonged before. At
all levels, the administrative machinery used and the powers entrusted to it seem
to betray the desire to extend in time a situation of fact which had apparently
been in line with certain post-World War II objectives of the French Government.
Still, it is hard to deny that in its institutional setup, in its mandate, and in its
functions, the Hafenverwaltung was an operational agency of an international
character8 1
The Danube Commission, as provided for in the 1948 Belgrade Convention,"2
offers some features which resemble those of an operational agency. Yet, while
its functions are the maintenance and operation of the waterway under its control,
its powers and obligations have been so much diminished at the expense of the
riparian States as compared with the European Danube Commission that its execu-
tive and operational tasks are merely ancillary to those of the riparian countries.
With that limitation, the present Danube Commission also finds its place here.
3
Cases in which especially the operational functions of international bodies are
very strongly developed in connection with the dredging of a waterway are the
International Mosel Company and the International Mosel Commission. The pur-
pose of these establishments is succintiy stated in article one of the Convention of
October 27, 1956,s between France, Germany, and Luxembourg; they are to render
the Mosel, between Koblenz and Thionvelle, accessible to ships of up to 15oo tons,
and thereby to facilitate and accelerate traffic in that waterway, primarily between
the Ruhr Valley and the Lorraine. The Mosel Company is to undertake the works
required for making the river navigable to that extent; the Commission is to safe-
guard the navigability of the river once that stage has been reached, to determine
the fees for the use of the waterway, and to guarantee the freedom of shipping
thereon. The 1956 Convention takes into account that the Mosel is a tributary of
the Rhine and, by a series of references to the treaties governing the status of the
latter river, provides for the application of certain relevant rules to the Mosel, notably
as regards the customs regime and the typical police powers, e.g., the maintenance of
health and safety, the control of which is one of the tasks of the Mosel Commis-
sion.!5 Yet, the status of the Mosel Commission is different from that of the Rhine
Central Commission," particularly in three respects:
so2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 347 (1953).
" Cf. Bernhardt, Kehler Hafen-Fall, 2 SCHLOCHAUER 218 (1961).
8233 U.N.T.S. No. 518, at i8I, 187 (1949).
"
2The European Commission of the Danube (see supra, at 642-43) does not belong to this group, as
its functions transcended the operational domain.
841I VERTRGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 35 (959).
I8 1d. arts. 29-33.
88 For a summary of its history and the present text of the treaties governing its operation, see x
PEASLEE 158.
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(I) As it has its own income from fees it will set, it is more independent.
(2) It has a stronger position as regards the works necessary for the upkeep of
the river in as much as it may initiate such action or enjoin the riparian
States from works which it considers undesirable! 7
(3) Finally, the Mosel Commission is subject to judicial control as regards its
executive and rule-making decisions by courts of the riparian States designated
in accordance with the Convention of Mannheim of 1868, with appeals not,
as in the case of the Rhine, to the Commission, but to an independent interna-
tional arbitral tribunal.s8
As regards the Mosel Company, the capital of which is distributed in proportions
which reflect the political and economic issues involved in that venture s' its novel
feature for purposes of the present discussion is the determination of the proper law
of the Society. Though the Company is a dosed corporation of German law-
Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter Haftung (G.m.b.H.)-it is governed by the Con-
vention, the Statute annexed to that Treaty, and only subsidiarily ("subsidiairement,"
"subsidiir") by the German law of closed corporations (G.m.b.H.-Gesetz) Y This
proviso is modeled in the same way as the corresponding rules of the European
Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (Eurochemic) Con-
vention, 91 on the lines of the 1955 Societ Europenne pour le Financement de
Materiel Ferroviaire (Eurofima) Convention,9" which in that respect had developed
further a concept first applied in the establishment of the Bank for International
Settlements and the statutes thereof: the international commercial corporation
created in execution of a treaty but deriving its legal personality from and being
subject to the law of a specific country.
Yet the subjection to a national law is only relative in as much as the German
Government guarantees the corporate rights of the foreign partners in the Mosel
Society against any changes of German company law subsequent to the coming into
force of the Convention which would adversely affect these rights. Furthermore, the
Society, its personnel, and activities benefit from so many privileges, exemptions, and
immunities that one is tempted to see in that special treatment a manifestation of
the international personality of that Luxembourg-Franco-German enterprise 3 which
at all levels of its administration and management is fitted to ensure balanced weight
to the German and French Governments in its day-to-day operation.
It will be recalled that the corresponding instance of international cooperation
in North America-the joint construction of the Saint Lawrence Seaway-was
brought about in a much less formal manner, the machinery used consisting of
" MOSEL CO.VrNTION arts. 36-37.
s Id. art. 35.
I d. art. 1o; STATUTE OF THE MOSEL SOCIETY arts. 5-7.
o0 MOSEL CONVENTION art. 9.
01 Dec. 2o, 1957; 13 VERTRXGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 340 (I96i).
0" For an unofficial English text of that Convention and of the Statutes, see 26 BULLETIN O THE IN-
TERNATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYS (1955).
aTo this effect, see ADAm, op. cit. supra note 71, at X56.
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parallel parliamentary action and,- in fact, coordinated -works by Canada and the
United States which had been preceded by the creation of the Saint Lawrence
Seaway Development Corporation on the part of the United States by Act of May
13, 1954, and the establishment in Canada of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Authorityy4
The exchange of notes of August 17, 1954, which marked the end of the preparatory
period, opened the way to a joint operational activity which, based on a tradition of
mutual confidence, helped to establish an international public service in the absence
of institutional arrangements in the form of treaties.
(b) Other authorities in the field of transportation. Still in the field of com-
munications but perhaps devoted to more modest objectives are the international
public services which were entrusted with the management of the Cape Spartel
Lighthouse, of the International Airport of Basle-Mulhouse, and which will construct
the tunnel under the Mont Blanc.
The International Commission of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse administered
the maintenance and upkeep of that lighthouse at the entrance of the Mediterranean
Sea until it was ended in 1958 in the wake of Morocco's accession to independence.°
The Basle-Mulhouse Airport, a joint Franco-Swiss "&ablissement public" created
by the Convention of July 4, 1949,90 marks one of the doctrinal stages that led to
the concept underlying Eurofima, as the Airport Authority is subject to French law
except where the Convention, the Statutes and the Annexes provide otherwise. This
amounts to a rebuttable presumption in favor of the applicability of French law,
whereas under the Eurofima Arrangement and in the instances modeled on its lines,
the international agreements prevail, and only lacunae are filled "subsidiairement"
by the application of a specific national law.
Finally, the Mont Blanc Tunnel arrangements"7 provide for two enterprises,
one Italian, the other French, to undertake the building of the tunnel on their
respective territories, and for the management of the tunnel by a corporation of which
each State subscribes half of the capital. The participation of the two contracting
parties in the administration of the tunnel is defined accordingly. The whole organi-
zational structure is supervised by a mixed Franco-Italian Commission. 8
While all of the international agencies in the field of communications discussed
thus far were related to a specific region or a specific inland waterway, the last insti-
9& 68 Stat. 95 (1954), 31 U.S.C. § 846 (1958) (defined as "wholly owned Government corporation");
68 Stat. 93 (I954), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 981-9o (x958); CAN. REv. STAr. ch. 242 (X952). On
the subject as a whole, see Cohen & Nadeau, The Legal Framework of the St. Lawrence Seaway, U. ILL.
L. F. 29 (959).
. Protocol of March 31, 1958, 38 DEP'T oF STATE BULL. 749 (958). For a description of the Cape
Spartel experience, see Stuart, The International Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 770
(1930), and Jssusr & TAUBENFELD, op. cit. supra note 18, at ioo-oi.
"0 The text of the Convention and Statute can be found in ADAM, op. cit. supra note 71, at 223 Ct
Seq.
q7 The text of this Convention can be found id. at 262.
98 The construction companies are subject to their respective national laws, and the supervisory bodies
apply the law of the place where they have to intervente. Id. arts. 2, 13. Special agreements on monetary,
fiscal, customs and social questions raised by the construction and upkeep of the Tunnel are envisaged by
art. x2.
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tution to be referred to, Eurofima,9 9 is to finance rolling stock for the railways of the
contracting parties whose national railway systems are the shareholders and at the
same time the users and clients of the corporation established by the Convention of
October 22, 1955. The latter is a Swiss corporation, governed by Swiss law "'a titre
subsidiaire" only, and obviously owes much to the trail-blazing precedent of ,the
Bank for International Setdements which has its seat, like Eurofima, in Basle. °
The considerable progress marked by Eurofima has since been confirmed by a
number of enterprises created also within the framework of European regional
organizations, notably in the nuclear field.'1 '
2. Nucleonics
Proceeding chronologically, however, the first operational agency102 in the field
of nucleonics is not one modeled along the lines of Eurofima but an entity which
itself has become a prototype of international public services: C.E.R.N. It grew out
of the UNESCO-sponsored Conseil Europ&n pour la Recherche Nucl~aire and lias
retained the latter's initials since, in spite of its present name, European Organisation
for Nuclear Research. This institution, set up by the Agreement of July i, 1953,103
is devoted exclusively to scientific research in the peaceful uses of the atom, in par-
ticular basic research, and maintains for that purpose laboratories in Meyrin near
Geneva, which are among the best equipped in the worldY0 4 This is its operational
task. It is financed by the Member States which are the users of the installation.
The latter serves as a European research center in nucleonics to which nationals of
non-Member States may be invited as fellows and guests by C.E.R.N.'s organs (Coun-
cil and Director). Though the Geneva institution is also the administrative center
of an association of States, its main purpose-the maintenance and management
of nuclear research installations-qualifies it as an international public service with
international personality.'0
This double nature is also a characteristic of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (I.A.E.A.). But whereas the constitutional designation of its purpose forces
C.E.R.N. to be an operational agency, the IA.E.A. is, under its basic instrument, an
international public service only potentially. True, its Statute 08 vests the agency
" European Company for the Financing of Railway Rolling Stock. See BULLETIn, op. cit. supra
note 92.
.0. Bank for International Settlements Statute art. 2 (location); Bank for International Settlements
Convention art. i (law applicable).
101 See infra, at 654-57.
'oa Except for the wartime cooperation between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
in the field of nucleonics which in the form of the Combined Development Agency approached institu-
tional character. See Hahn, Atomenergie, Friedliche Nutzung, I ScH.ocsauErz 100, 102-03 (196o), and
the literature quoted therein.
... C.E.R.N. Agreement, July 1, 1953, 5 VERTRXCa DER BUND.SREPUBLIK 465 (1956) (in force since
Sept. 29, 1954).
10, For a detailed report, see DRY)CK, op. cit. supra note 57, at 46; Hahn, Europdi.che Organisation
ffr Kernenphysikalische Forschung, i Scm.ocHAUER 473 (596o), and the literature quoted therein.
'"o For a list of treaties concluded by C.E.R.N., see DRCIcx, op. cit. supra note 57, at 47, 48.
10. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1093,
1095, T.LA.S. No. 3873.
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-with powers that would permit its activity in the whole range of the peaceful uses
of the atom as well as ancillary sciences and services. Yet within this wide domain,
its powers may be exercised only if Member States accept voluntarily aid from, and
in consequence, control by, the Agency. Nor is there any constraint for Member
States to make available special fissionable or any other nuclear materials, facilities,
or information to the Agency for distribution among other contracting parties in need
thereof.
The detailed provisions of the Statute, and the efforts made thereunder for the
exchange of information and the promotion of research, the supplying of materials,
the exchange and training of scientists and experts and the control by the Agency
to exclude the use for other than peaceful uses and to ensure the application of
generally accepted safety standards need not remain without consequences. 10 7 But
the scarcity of fissionable material belongs to the past. There now is an abundance
of uranium and of nuclear information, even as to highly recent developments.
Atomic information is no longer the top-secret matter it used to be in the early
days of nucleonics and up to the late fifties. Purely commercial relationships are
about to be used on a large scale to bring about the nuclear equipment of nations in
fields in which it was thought during the drafting of the I.A.E.A. Statute and during
a certain period thereafter that the Agency should display its main activity1 s
Yet there remain sectors in which this universal intergovernmental organization,
which includes States from both sides of the Iron Curtain, will play an uncontested
role: it is to establish, in consultation and collaboration with the United Nations and
its specialized agencies concerned, world-wide standards of safety for protection of
health and minimization of danger to life and property (including such standards
for labor conditions), and to insure their application in its own installations and in
those which it is invited, or entitled by virtue of project agreements, to control for that
purpose. It is also to provide for an appropriate documentation center and further
the access of underdeveloped areas and their scientists to the uses of the atom and
of connected scientific disciplines. Yet it may be doubted whether these are typical
operational tasks109
The Euratom Treaty provides for a number of operational agencies, the respective
importance of which can no longer be measured on the basis of the Treaty and its
travaux pr-paratoires alone, particularly as developments beyond the control of the
framers have considerably changed-and weakened-the role of the Euratom Supply
Agency.
That Supply Agency, during the drafting of the Euratom Compact widely hailed
or decried as a significant step towards a technocracy within the Community and
"° See I.A.E.A. ANN. REP. (U.N. Doc. No. INFCIRC/ 4 (1959)); [1959-6o] BOARD ort GoVERNOItS
ANN. REP. 114 (U.N. Doc. No. GC(IV) (I96O)).
"I I.A.A PREPARATORY COMM'N REP. (U.N. Doc. No. GCi/x-GOV/s (x957)).
109 Perhaps it is yet too early for such a judgment. As the list of Agreements concluded by the
IA.E.A. shows, the initial period does not seem to be over yet, as most of the Agreements have been
organizational rather than operational in nature. U.N. Doc. No. INFCIRC/2o (ig6o).
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its Member States,"' was to be a kind of statutory monopoly exclusively responsible
for the supply of all consumers in the community with nuclear ores, concentrates
and fuels. It was thus to secure an appropriate influence for the community and the
consumers living therein on a market which was presumed to be narrow and
dominated by scarcity and its usual concomitants. The Member States were to
guarantee the free exercise of the Agency's function in their territories and to com-
municate to it all information, or ensure the transmittal thereof by their subjects,
necessary for the accomplishment of the Agency's tasks. Finally, they and their
subjects were to accept the determination of prices and conditions of sale and
purchase.
In fact, the market in fissionable material and nuclear equipment and facilities
soon after the signing of the Euratom Treaty on March 25, 1957, became such that
the buyer was no longer exposed to dictation by the producer or seller, but could
negotiate his terms by the usual commercial means. The doctrinal rigidity which
wanted to reserve to the Agency an option on any ores, concentrates, and fuels
produced in the Community,"1 the monopoly for the supply of all consumers," 2
and the monopoly for the import and export of that material," 3 had been already
weakened by a set of clauses in the Treaty which in fact conceded that the Agency
should only authorize agreements already negotiated between producers and con-
sumers, and act as a kind of commodity exchange in nuclear material without any
proper influence on the prices other than that flowing from supply and demand.
The Statute of the Agency" 4 and its practice, as well as that of the Commission
established thereunder, have only confirmed the relatively modest practical im-
portance of this new institution." 5
On the other hand, at least one of the joint enterprises provided for in the
Euratom Treaty seems to be established as envisaged by the relevant clauses of the
basic instrument." Within the meaning of the Euratom Compact, joint enterprises
are undertakings-existing or to be established-of fundamental importance for the
development of nuclear industry in the community (and not only in a Member State)
in the establishment and management of which the organization, its Member States,
110 See Bfilck, Zur Systematik der Europdischen Wirtschajtsgemeinschaten, 3 BERIcHTE DER DRUTSCH-
EN GEELLSCHAFr FOR V6LKERRECiHT 66, io-o6 and nn. x22, 123 thereat (1959).
... Euratom Treaty arts. 52(2b), 57-63.
"Id. arts. 52(2b), 6o, 61.
... Id. arts. 52(2b), 5 9 (b).
.1. Euratom Supply Agency Statute, Nov. 6, 1958, [1958] AMTSBLATT DER EuROPXISCHEN GEMEIN-
SCHAFrEN 534-
115 "It . . . seems necessary to limit the operations of the Agency to a minimum compatible with the
provisions of the treaty, and to afford users and producers a large degree of freedom in their business
operations." EutRTom Comm 'N TRoisi m RAPPORT GA NRAx.. suR L'AC'rrVITP DE LA COMmUNAuTi 64,
para. 87 (196o). [Ed. transl.].
"' Euratom Treaty arts. 45-51. The first joint enterprise is to be built at Chooz, in the French
Ardennes, and will be maintained by the Soci&6 Nuclaire Franco-Belge des Ardennes (S.E.N.A.). For
a detailed report, see COUNCIL Doc. No. R/ 9 63 /6o (Oct. 7, i96o). The Decision establishing S.E.N.A.
has been adopted, and its Statute-of April 27, ig6x-approved by the Euratom Council on September
9, i965, [I96i] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTe. 1173, 1175, which appeared after the completion
of this paper.
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or private capital may take part. They. enjoy certain privileges as regards local tax
laws and other levies and assessments. These special rules, like the rule that national
legislation may be applied- subsidiarily," 7 betray the influence of the Eurofima
Convention and notably of the Mosel Convention." 8
The third group of entities of an operational character provided for in the
Euratom Treaty are the institutions of research and higher learning which in the
Treaty are referred to as the Joint Nuclear Research Center, the Central Bureau of
Nuclear Measurements, and the Institution at University Level." 9 The Euratom
Commission has begun to establish the two entities first named, which are endowed
with far-reaching privileges and immunities,' 20 but has not yet arrived at definitive
results as regards the University project. 21
In its nonregulatory activities, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (E.N.E.A.),
the operational arm of the O.E.E.C. in the field of nucleonics, is comparable neither
to C.E.R.N. nor to the operational entities provided for in the Euratom Treaty. To
begin with, E.N.E.A. is not an international organization of its own, but only an
organ, for a specific sphere of action, of the O.E.E.C., which latter alone has legal
personality under international law and the law of the Member States' 22 Apart
from its legislative achievements, particularly in the field of protection of the popula-
tion at large and of workers in nuclear installations and related fields against nuclear
radiation, 2 3 the conclusion of a Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy,2 4 the liberalization of trade in special nuclear material,
nuclear facilities and equipment, 2 5 and the first steps towards a supervision and
emergency warning system in cases of increase in environmental radioactivity, its
great success in the operational field121a is the establishment, under its aegis, of what
are by now three joint undertakings: Eurochemic, and the reactor projects in Halden,
Norway, and Winfrith, United Kingdom
26
5 1 7Euratom Treaty art. 49-
118 See supra, at 65o-5x.
1 1 9Euratom Treaty arts. 6-9.
'-o For technical indications regarding the research establishments at Ispra, Italy; Petten, Netherlands;
and Karlsruhe, Germany, as well as the Central Bureau of Nuclear Measurements, see EuJATom CoMM'x
TROS5imE RAPPORT GAN RAL, op. cit. supra note 115, at 29. For the most recent developments, see Id.,
QUATRxkME RAPPORT GENERAL 15-52 (1961).
... See COMITA INTMUTMAIRE POUR L'UNivERSITi, RAPPORT AUX CONSILS DR LA COMMUNAUT- ECON-
OMIQUR EUROPIEENNE ET DE LA COMM(UNAUT EUROPkENNE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQTJE (1957), and id.,
QuAitME RAPPORT GENEMAL 58 (596i).
... E.N.E.A. was established by Decision C(57)255 of the Council of the O.E.E.C. on Dec. 17, 1957,
5 EUROPEAN YE-AtBoos 273 (1957).
... O.E.E.C. Council Decision C(59)109 (Final) of June 12, 1959 (on the Adoption of Radiation
Protection Norms).
"', July 29, ig6o.
"OX8 .E.E.C. Council Decision C(56)io9 (Final) of July 1g, 1956 (concerning Standstill Measures
in respect of Intra-European Trade in the Field of Nuclear Energy, extended from time to time by
Decisions of the O.E.E.C. Council).
""Recommendation of the O.E.E.C. Council C(6x)98 (Final) of July 7, x961.
... For a particularized report, see Hahn, Europdische Kernenergie-Agentur, i SCHLocHAUER 471
(ig6o) (with bibliography); Wolff, Centro Internazionale di studi e Documentozione sulle Communita
Europee, IL DsRrrro DELL'ENERGIA NUCLEARE 239, 244-53 (1961).
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The Eurochemic, in Mol, Belgium, was the first joint undertaking .of the
O.E.E.C. in the field of nuclear energy. It was established by a treaty 27' The,
privileges and immunities enjoyed by Eurochemic, its tasks, and the fact that a-
special group of instructed Government representatives make decisions concerning.
certain important matters, raise some doubt as to whether Eurochemic has been-
correctly named a "joint stock company-societt par actions"12 as that notion is.
presently understood. Again, Eurochemic, like Eurofima and the institutions.
modeled on its lines, is subject, in the first place, to a Convention providing for its
establishment and a Statute annexed thereto, i.e., conventional international law,.
and only subsidiarily to Belgian law.
Though Eurochemic has been a success, both operationally and politically,' 29'
it must not be overlooked that the E.N.E.A. has not used the same legal devices iEL
the establishment of its more recent joint undertakings. Neither the Agreement of
June 11, 1958, concerning the Halden (Norway) Boiling Water Reactor Project, nor
the Agreement of March 23, 1959, concerning the High Temperature Gas Cooledl
Reactor Project at Winfrith, United Kingdom, create a corporate entity with.
legal personality, but are limited to the distribution of financial charges resulting-
from the arrangement, and to procedural and substantive details concerning research-
work pursuant to the Agreement. The reactors and the installations appertaining
thereto remain the property of the national institutions which have assumed the-
obligation to build and to operate these common undertakings. It is evident that
the two more recent project arrangements of the E.N.EA. provide for a lesser degree-
of internationalization than Eurochemic which is truly an international corporation
under European law' 3
0
Finally, one of the most recent international operational agencies in the field of
nuclear energy is the Nordisk Institut for Teoretisk Atomifysik. Its structure is.
closely modeled on the lines of the C.E.R.N. Agreement of 1953. The Convention
among the five Scandinavian states, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden, establishing the Copenhagen Institute 31 is another product of the movement
towards regional organizations in the fields of nucleonicsP'3
3. Economics and Finance
There are numerous international operational agencies in the field of economics.
and finance. One of the earliest and most successful institutions of this kind has.
'"
7Eurochemic Treaty, Dec. 20, 1957; 13 VERTRXGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 340 (1961).
.2 Eurochemic Statute art. I.
120 See BALKE, op. cit. supra note 69, at 8; WOLFGANG CAITELLERI, GRuND s;LzLICaE RE Crrs-
PROBLEME DES ATONIGESFrzES 7 (s96o) (Ver~ffentlichungen des Instituts far Energierecht an der Uni-
versitit Bonn).
'
0 The two agreeements are published in INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, LEGAL SERIS No."
1, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 233, 249 (1959).
... Nordita (Nordisk Organisation for Teoretisk Atomfysik) is operated on a provisional basis, since
the convention formally establishing the organization has still not been finally agreed upon. Letter fronm
the Danish O.E.E.D. Delegation to the author, Sept. I, i961. See also, 15 NUCLEAR PHYSICS 390-9r
(196o) (Dutch).
... For an account on this trend, see 2 GEORG DAm, VrLKERRECHT 778, 784 (i96i).
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been the Bank for International Settlements (B-IS.) in Basle, incorporated in con-
formity with an international convention' 3' and having legal personality as a com-
pany limited by shares under Swiss law.'34 Its share capital was initially distributed
among European Central Banks, one American and one Japanese group, which
latter, however, resold its shares to European Central Banks."" Originally the
B.I.S. was to serve as an instrument for winding up the reparations which Germany
had to pay under the Treaty of Versailles and under the Young Plan. To this end,
it was to replace political authorities which, until i93o and under the Dawes Plan,
had supervised the transfer and the distribution of the German reparation payments.
At the same time, however, the Bank has more general tasks under its statute.
Indeed, the latter have since become its main field of operation.
The Bank is now the agent of the O.E.E.C. for the execution of the European
Monetary Agreement.36 It also has important functions in the framework of the
1953 Agreement on the Settlement of German External Debts,' 37 and is responsible
for the management and servicing of the 1954 loan floated by the European Coal and
Steel Community on the American market. 3 The Bank for International Settle-
ments continues to aid central banks in the field of international payments by
facilitating and executing gold transfers among these national agencies.
Hardly comparable with the B.I.S. is the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (I.B.R.D.), established in the wake of the war"" to secure long
term capital for the devastated economies of the European and Asian belligerents,
as well as investments in countries in the process of development. The I.B.R.D.
is a world-wide organization, and its sixty-six members (at the end of I96O) had
by that time subscribed to a capital of over nineteen billion dollars.140 Subscriptions
are not the only source of the Bank's income. It has floated a considerable number
of loans on the American and European markets which, after 1947 and even more so
after the end of Marshall Plan aid, have been directed to non-European countries
for basic investments, communications, agriculture, and forestry. In principle, it is
the government of a member country which is the recipient of a loan from the bank.
For other recipients, the government or the central bank concerned must guarantee
to service the loan.
To overcome the limitation that loans can only be given to governments or
government guaranteed recipients, and the further restriction that such loans may
... Hague Convention, Jan. 20, 1930, 5 HUDSON 307; Statutes attached to the Convention, 5 HuDsoN
314.
"' Constituent Charter, para.i; Statutes art. I.
"3 RoGan AuBOIN, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEmENTS, 1930-1955, at 4 (Princeton Essays
in International Finance No. 22, 1955).
'European Monetary Agreement, Aug. 5, r955, art. 2o, as amended by Supplementary Protocol
No. 3, Jan. x5, 196o, and O.E.E.C. Council Decision C(6o)1 4 6 (Final), July i9, 196o,
'$"Agreement of German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, [X953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 443, T.I.A.S. No.
2792; 3 VERTRXGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 85 et seq. (956).
"' See JEAN SALMON, LE R&E DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES EN MATIiRE DE PR.TS ET
D'EMPRUNTS, PROBLIME5 YURIDIQUES 287 (1957).
139I.B.R.D. Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 VERTRXGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 313 (1956); 9
HuDsON 889.
.0 Press Release of I.B.R.D. European (Paris) Office, March zo, 1961, p. I.
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only be given at fixed interest rates, the I.B.R.D. in 1955 founded a subsidiary, the
International Finance Corporation. That institution141 is to invest in private enter-
prise without government guarantees and to undertake general financial operations
of an ordinary commercial character, wherever possible in collaboration with private
investorsY4
2
While the main activity of the economic institutions discussed so far' 43 is opera-
tional in nature, the International Monetary Fund has also important regulatory
powers.144 The operational part of the Fund's activity consists in the rendering of
financial assistance-standby credits 45--in the case of balance of payments difficulties
which in a number of cases have been used to stabilize the economies of member
countries in conjunction with short-term credits from the European Payments
Union,'46 and now from the European Fund 47 which is administered by the
O.E.E.C. under the European Monetary Agreement. 4 '
The latter, a regional agreement on financial cooperation among the eighteen
members of the O.E.E.C., provides for two activities: (i) a multilateral system of
settlements among these States which is operated by the Bank for International
Settlements under the supervision of a Board of Management and the authority of
the Council of the O.E.E.C.; 49 (2) the granting of credits to contracting parties in
order to aid them to withstand temporary over-all balance of payments difficulties
that endanger economic relations between the O.E.E.C. MembersY'5 Like the
E.N.E.A.' 5' the European Fund has no legal personality of its own; its assets are
held in trust by the O.E.E.C. which alone has legal capacity. 52
141 International Finance Corporation, Articles of Agreement, April ii, 1955, 10 VERTRXGE DEX
BUNDESREPUBLIK 433 (958).
.. See I.F.C. FOURTH ANN. REP. (1959-6o), and I.F.C. Press Release, Feb. 24, 196r. The latter
contains a memorandum from the President of the I.F.C. of Feb. io, I96i, on a proposal for amending-
article III of the I.F.C.'s Articles of Agreement, so as to enable it to invest in capital stock. On the law-
applicable to I.F.C., see infra, at 664.
. To which institutions must be added, since Sept. 24, 196o, the International Development Associa-
tion, another creationf of the I.B.R.D. with worldwide membership. I.B.R.D. Press Release, supra note
140, at 9. Under its Articles of Agreement of April 26, 196o, it is to "raise standards of living in the
less-developed areas of the world included within the Association's membership" (art. I), and to use for
that purpose techniques of intergovernmental financing designed to make that assistance bear less heavily
on the balance of payments than do conventional loans. See ExEcTrrivE DmrcToRs ON THs ARTICLES OF-
AGREEMENT OF I.D.A. REP. (Jan. 26, 196o).
"'Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 VERTRXGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 227 (1956); 9 HUDSON"
820. On the regulatory activities of the I.M.F., see the summary in 2 GZorG DArer, V6LKEEREC-T 6x2-
16 (1961) and I.M.F. ANN. REP. 26-31 (196o). On the doctrinal implications of these activities, see
Aufricht, The Fund Agreement and the Legal Theory of Money, so 6sMa-ulaIcInscHE ZEITSCMUnT F0
6FPENTLiCHES REcHrr 26 (1959).
1' Another transaction open to the Fund and its members is the purchase and repurchase technique
available under article 5 of the I.M.F. Articles of Agreement. For comments on this, see Mann, Money ir
Public International Law, 96 R.C. i, 22-25 (1959, I).
" For a summary, see MANAGING BOARD OF THE E.P.U., FINAL REP. 21 (1959).
u' See BOARD O MANAGEMENT OF THE E.M.A. SECOND ANN. REP. 54-65 (1961).
211 See note 136, supra.
1 0E.M.A. arts. 8-x6.
1.. id. arts. 2-7.
... In this respect, the European Fund is also like the European Productivity Agency and the Office for
Scientific and Technical Personnel. For a concise description of these operational branches of the O.E.E.C.,
66o -- LAw AND CONnmPORARY PRoBLEMs
Still in the economic and financial field, the Treaty establishing the European
-Economic Community provides for three entitites of an operational character. The
first is the European Social Fund, which is to contribute to the retraining and the
aesettlement of workers whose employment has to be changed as a consequence of
structural changes ensuing from the operation of the Common MarketYO3 According
ito article 199 of the Treaty, the income and expenditure of the fund forms part of
•the budget of the Community.
The European Investment Bank,"' the second of the operational entities created
-by the E.E.C. Treaty, is to grant loans and guarantees on a non-profit basis to facili-
tate the financing of projects for developing less developed regions, for modernizing
,or converting enterprises or creating new activities where these are required but
,cannot be financed entirely by Member States, and finally for projects which are
,of common interest to several Member States whose financial means are insufficient
to cover the expenditure required. The Bank is an independent corporate entity
-with legal personality, necessarily limited to the internal law of the Member States.0 5
'Its decisions are to be in line with normal banking procedures, and it is to borrow
-the funds necessary for its tasks in the international capital markets when its capital
,does not suffice.!5" The third operational entity created by the E.E.C. Treaty is the
Development Fund for the promotion and acceleration of economic growth in the
,overseas territories of Member States. It enjoys a wider degree of operational in-
-dependence than the Social Fund, but it is also administered by the Commission.'57
.4. Refugees, human rights, and cultural activities
In a field which may be in rather general terms described as operational activities
for the furtherance and protection of human rights, the United Nations has first
-established the International Refugee Organization for handling the special prob-
lems created by the displacement of people during and after the war. Its successor
since I95i, the United Nations Office for Refugees, administers a special refugee fund
fed by voluntary contributions from member countries.'5 8 Special funds were also
see BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR WIRTSCHAFT, DER EUROXPISC.x WmIRTSCAPTSRAT, HANDBUCH 1959, at 77-83
(I959)-
2 To this effect, see Huet, L'Accord Monitaire Europien du 5 A4ot z955, I A.F. 455, 461 (1955).
Ir3 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 123-28. For comment, see WOHLPARTH, ET AL., Op. Ci. supra note 52, at 375 et
.eq.; POLITICAL AND EcONOmIC PLANNING (PEP), EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONs 305 (r959).
"' E.E.C. Treaty arts. x29-3o.
... International personality is all the more likely to accrue, as the Bank's legal capacity has not been
limited to any one legal order, and thus the development need not jump hurdles as in the case of the
B.I.S. See infra, at 663.
... E.E.C. Treaty art. 130 and the Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank. On the
law applicable to the transactions of the Bank, see infra, at 664 n.z82.
21 Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the Community of the Overseas, Coun-
tries and Territories art. i.
'"It is submitted that the Technical Assistance Board of the United Nations, established by the 1949
'General Assembly, Resolution 304 (IV), also belongs to the group of international services in the field
-of economics and finance. It pursues the activities which its name indicates and is financed out of
-voluntary contributions pledged by Governments to a special account established by the Secrctary-General
-of the United Nations separate from the regular budgets of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies.
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created to meet the problems ensuing from hostilities in Palestine and Korea' 59
These funds are administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 6 ' and the United Nations Korean Recon-
struction Agency,16' respectively.
The United Nations Children's Fund, another operational agency of the United
Nations, is mainly financed by contributions from member nations, but also through
the sale of commemorative cards and public collections. 62 The Agency subsidizes
special programs for children, especially in the sphere of child health.
63
VI
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS
Few if any of the international institutions discussed here lack such powers of
supervision and control as may be suitable for the enforcement of the substantive
and procedural provisions of their constituent instruments.6 A classification of
the various modes of supervision and control according to the degree of their
effectiveness 165 helps to discover several control schemes which reflect the gradual
progress of this technique of international law enforcement.
There is, of course, a supervision which consists in no more than the collection,
scrutiny, and distribution of information by international offices. This system is
current in the international administrative unions which have existed since the end of
the last century' 6 6
Almost on the same level are the supervisory functions of the regional and other
subcommissions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, though
as a practical matter, these have a possibility of influencing public opinion by the
publication of reports and factual data advocating certain policies to be followed
by Member States in specific fields.
16 7
' Palestine: G.A. Res. of November 19, 1948, 212 (III), creating special fund; Korea: G.A. Res. 41o
A(V) of December 1, 1950, para. 8.
"o Established by G.A. Res. 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949.
"'1 Established by G.A. Res. 41o A (V) of December i, 1950.
... Established under U.N. G.A. Res. 57(l) of Dec. I', X946, and continued under Resolution 802
(VIII) which also changed the name from United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund to
the present designation.
...The two funds of the Council of Europe are mentioned, infra at notes 179 and I8o. Apart from
the discussion of the Soviet technique in this field by ADAm, op. cit. supra note 71, at 190-97, see also
DRicK, op. cit. supra note 57, at 49-52. On the Komatom Institute of the Soviet bloc States in Dubna
near Moscow which has the same, or substantially similar tasks as C.E.R.N. but is said to have no
international personality and almost no privileges and immunities, see DRiieK, op. cit. supra note 57, at
49-52. This book also contains a German translation of the Convention and the Statute of the Dubna
Institute of Sept. 23, 1956, id. at 144-53.
.04 On instances of international control by functional intergovernmental organizations, see JssUP &
TAUBENFELD, op. cit. supra note 18, at 11-134.
...For such a classification and the reasons for it, see Hahn, Internationale Kontrollen, in 2
SCHLoCHAIUER 66 (i961).
... See Wehberg, Entwic lungsstufen der Internationalen Organisation, 52 FRIEDNSWAR T 193, 198
(1954).
"07 However, the U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee may give binding directives to the High
Commissioner for Refugees. Article 68, General Survey, 2 REasRToRy op PRACTic oF U.N. ORoANs Supp.
No. i, at 121, 123 (1958).
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Still higher on this scale of control schemes are those agencies which may employ
any methods of supervision feasible, except controls on the spot.' Where control
on the spot is made, its legal basis is either an ad hoc agreement between the super-
visory international agency and the territorial sovereign for a specific case, or it is
set out in the treaty constituting a particular agency of controlV6 D
These phenomena prove the existence of various means for observing facts of
international legal relevance with a view to determining whether pertinent rules of
international law are complied with. But in recent times, observation has fre-
quently been coupled with procedures for the rectification of acts or omissions not in
compliance with obligations under treaties or customary international law.'
0  Of
course, most of these corrective measures can be directed only against States, and may
be enforced against individuals solely by the territorial sovereign itself or with its
authorization in each specific case.
But even among the international-as distinguished from supranational-organi-
zational treaties concluded between 195 o and i96o, there are instances where control
is directed by virtue of such a treaty immediately against individuals, enterprises,
and associations. Furthermore, although most agencies capable of giving financial
support to States lack the power of on-the-spot control, practice has widely recog-
nized their right to dispatch missions, and to appoint permanent control organs for
no other purpose than to keep a close watch in the territory of the State or States
concerned on the advisability of assistance before the granting of aid, on its use
during the period of credit, and on accounts at the moment of repayment.
The most remarkable progress of international control has been made in Europe
in the treaties establishing the three Communities among the Six. It is impossible
to give in a few lines even an approximate picture of the various methods employed
to ensure a permanent administrative control, a judicial control which is comparable
to judicial supervision of the executive and the legislative branches of government
in the Member States of the supranational communities, and a political control
through the European Parliament which, though only slowly emerging," is never-
theless already a legal and political force.'1 Suffice it to say that differences in the
methods of control provided for in the constitutions of the supranational communities
and, e.g., in the E.F.TA. Convention which was concluded after the establishment
of the E.E.C. and the Euratom, indicate more than a divergence of techniques. This
seems to signify that controls as incisive and far-reaching as those envisaged in the
supranational treaties presuppose a political decision to integrate the Member
"'
8 As under the international commodity agreements.
... E.g., the Convention on Security Control of Dec. 20, 1957, concluded under the aegis of O.E.E.C./
E.N.E.A., 13 VERTRXGE nER BUNDESREPUBLIK 310 (ig6I).
'"°For a list of cases, see Kopelmanas, Le Contr6le Internationale, 77 R.C. 58 132 et seq. (x95o, 11).
"'
5 See Convention, supra note i69.1 2 See Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging Political Control, 13
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 233 (1959)-
173 See e.g., E.E.C. Treaty art. 144 (resignation of Commission on motion of censure).
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States and their populations-and not only with respect to specific, functionally
defined matters.
VII
Tim LAw OF INTER.NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL PUBLic AUTHOmims
This paper has shown that the law of international and supranational public
authorities is part of the law of international, intergovernmental institutions. The
treaty basis and the obligation to serve the community of interests which the States
concerned have acknowledged among themselves in establishing an international
authority are features common to all international institutions, not only to these
authorities. International administrations and executive and regulatory agencies are
analyzed in a growing number of monographs on international institutions and
organizations of which they are typical examples; and non-judicial international
controls-long a forgotten subject-are now also discussed with increasing fre-
quency. 74 A brief summary of the main legal features of international public
services may contribute to the doctrinal evaluation of that subject, which has, com-
paratively speaking, been neglected up to now.
The legal status of these operational agencies is dependent on their functions,
as their legal personality under national or international law seems less determined
by the constituent treaties than by the practice of the States and the agencies applying
these treaties. For instance, the international personality of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements is still disputed by writers.0 ' But in practice, it exercises the
essential concomitants of international personality, although it has been refused that
quality in the Convention providing for its establishment and its Charter despite a
proposal to the contrary which was discussed at length during the travaux prepara-
toires.1'7 Today, the majority of writers and the treaty-making departments of a
considerable number of governments see no harm in treating the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements as a contracting party to arrangements that are treaties.'
7
There may be cases where such an evolution is excluded because the operational
agency is a branch of another institution which alone has legal standing under
international and national law alike.' Yet the example of the two special funds
of the Council of Europe17 9 shows that even in such a situation, circumstances may
1" See supra, at 661-63, and notes 164-66, 170, 172 supra.
27' For a survey of the authorities, see Hahn, Der Massiab der internationalen Aufsicht im Friedens-
vdlerrecht, zo J.I.R. 2, 8 n.33 (I96).
171 Part III of the Message of the Swiss Federal Council to Swiss Federal Parliament "relatif
rapprobation de la Convention concernant la banque des rfglements internationaux ... ," of Feb. 7, 1930.
'7E.g., the Agreement of May 13, 1948, between the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and
the B.I.S., 140 U.N.T.S. No. x888, at 187 (1952); Agreement of Jan. 9, 1953, between the B.IS. and the
Federal Republic of Germany, 3 VERTR.GE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 187 (1956).
178 As is true in the case of the operational arms of the O.E.E.C. (European! Fund, E.N.E.A., and
O.S.T.P.), see supra, at 656, 659.
... Council of Europe Resettlement Fund, established by Resolution 56(9) of the Committee of
Ministers of April 16, x956; Cultural Fund of the Council of Europe, established by Resolution 58(13),
June 16, 1958.
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force the mother organization to admit the distinct legal personality of one sub-
sidiary, but allow it to refuse the same to the other.8 0
There are a great number of cases where the constituent instrument expressly
confers the capacity to act under national or international law. But unless an inter-
national public service is part of the organizational setup of a State or of one of its
territorial or political subdivisions and meant to remain such an instrumentality with
the resulting sovereign powers, its legal personality under national or international
law need not be stipulated by a treaty to be a reality. That lesson may safely be
drawn from the as yet rather brief history of international public services.
As regards the privileges and immunities of these operational agencies, three
groups of cases can be distinguished. First, there are organizations like the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and the European Organization for Nuclear Research,
which have by and large the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United
Nations and its Specialized Agencies and are subject to no other law than that of
their constituent instrument, rules and regulations made thereunder by their organs,
and such principles of conventional or customary international law as the constitutive
instrument or internal legislative acts may declare applicable. There the sovereign
character of the agencies' activity has been deemed so predominant that submission
to a national law was considered as inadvisable, though specific operational activities
may be treated differently if the organs of the institutions see fit to do so.""'
The second group, represented, e.g., by the International Finance Corporation,18 2
still has no general attachment to any national law, although it may subject specific
agreements to the internal law of a State, but no longer enjoys jurisdictional im-
munity. Still, the I.F.C. is exempt from taxes and customs duties, and its archives,
property, and assets are not subject to search and seizure of whatever kind. The
intrinsic justification of the submission of the I.F.C. and like institutions to ordinary
judicial processes lies in the need both to protect and to strengthen the confidence of
individuals and enterprises in the trustworthiness of the entity.
Finally, there are a number of operational agencies which are subject to a specific
national law in the sense that lacunae in the organic instrument must be or may be' 8
filled by the relevant rules of that national law. This feature, usually accom-
panied by a number of legal advantages which place the entities concerned some-
where between tax-privileged public utilities under internal law and an international
organization without jurisdictional immunity, can be found especially in Europe,
beginning with the Bank for International Settlement and more developed in
Eurofima, Eurochemic, and the joint enterprises envisaged by the Euratom Treaty.
180 Namely, to the Cultural Fund. On the development of the two cases, see Kiss, Les Fonds
Sp'ciaux du Conseil de L'Europe, 5 A.F. 659 et seq. (1959).1 8 1
on this point, see the divergent views expressed in Verdross, Die Sicherung von auslandischen
Privatrechten ars Abkommen zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung mit Schiedsklauseln, 18 ZErTSCHRFsr AI3R
AUSLXNDISCHES 5FFENTLICHES REcHrT trND VxEtnIUcirT 635 (1959), and Mann, The Proper Law of
Contracts Concluded by International Persons, 35 BriT. Ya. INTL L. 349-50 (1959).
1
" And probably most of the Special Funds of the United Nations, as well as the Development Fund
and the European Investment Bank of the E.E.C.
"' See Euratom Treaty art. 49, para. 4.
INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL PUBLIC AuTHORiTiEs
Depending on their place within the above classification, the organizational struc-
ture of the international public services is either (i) an intergovernmental organiza-
tion with a council of government representatives which may either delegate powers
or a part thereof to a small deliberative and policy-making body,' or retain them
and supervise a Secretary General or Director with executive functions aided by the
Secretariat; x' 5 or (2) a joint stock corporation or a limited liability company as it is
known in its basic features in most national laws: a body representing the share-
holders, and the management. However, there always intervenes, either as part of
the corporate structure8 8 or as a supervisory body, an institution which is political in
nature and is to safeguard the non-technical interests of the participating governments
in the venture.
Although the source of financial resources is highly important, few authorities can
rely for that purpose on tax-like assessments. Among these happy few are the High
Authority of the E.C.S.C, which is financed from the coal and steel levy under the
constituent treaty 87 and the agencies responsible for the dredging and maintenance
of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Mosel, which collect tolls. The others either
have to rely on loans if they need income beyond their working capital, as is the case
with several of the banking institutions, or they are financed through allocations in
the budget of another international agency or agencies.'8 Finally, the numerically
most important group is dependent on annual budgets financed by payments of
Member States. If the consequences ensuing from the latter situation may not
always contribute to the operational independence of public international services,
that element, like so many others, reflects appropriately the present stage of evolution
of these agencies-midway between the political cooperation of States and the
operation of international services solely in accordance with the technical require-
ments of their users and of their functions.
'
8 1 I.B.R.D., I.F.M.
: O.E.E.C., E.F.T.A.
x Eurochemie.
... But even the E.C.S.C. High Authority had to bolster its finances by loans. See SALMoN, op. cit.
supra note 138, at 287.
... E.g., the European Social Fund
